Abstract-Automated Trust Negotiation aims to securely identify the consensus between two sets of policies consisting of certificates, with minimal disclosure of policies to each other. The paper proposes a new scheme that allows both parties to learn whether or not, both parties agree to transfer a given target certificate to the requesting party. No policy is revealed after performance of the protocol. No certificate is known to each other.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automated trust negotiation (ATN) aims to allow two parties to securely exchange digital credentials in X.509 format [l] that contain sensitive infonnation such as name, address, birthday and memberships, as well as access control decisions (what credentials are acceptable). Both parties wish to minimize information to disclose to other party in order to learn the minimal agreement of both private policies.
Winsborough et al. proposes the first scheme for ATN, classified into two extreme strategies, called, parsimonious and eager strategies in [2] , [3] , [4] . The eager strategy requires parties to disclose credentials as soon as its access control policy is satisfied, while in parsimonious strategy, the parties disclose credentials only after a successful outcome is ensured through negotiations. In both schemes, two parties need to reveal their partial policies gradually and hence no privacy is preserved.
A number of cryptographic protocols have been proposed so far to address secure and private ATN. Li, Du and Boneh proposes an oblivious signature based envelop in which a user send her credentials to a server who jointly compute with the user such that she sees the requested resource if and only if both policies are consistent in [5] . Camenisch and Lysyanskaya presented an anonymous credential which allows any party to prove statements without being linked and proved its security based on the strong RSA assumption and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in [11] . Nakatsuka and Ishida presents a scheme to minimize the sum of costs for disclosure of credentials in [6] .
Contributions: In this paper, we present a new automated trust negotiation scheme that ensures perfect privacy preserving which satisfies the following properties; 2) no policy is revealed even after negotiation has made, and 3) both parties learns whether their access control policies have agreement, or not with respect to a target resource (certificate or credential). Although the above requirements sounds infeasible, because of redundancy of a logical formula of access control policy, an agreement of policies can be ensured without disclosure of policies. Let us suppose that client C has a policy "open student id (credential) c if server has official certificate either 81 or 82", and server S has both 81 and 82. Client C does not necessary learn which of two certificates is used to show his/her credential c. Using our proposed scheme, both parties are able to securely make sure that their access control policies are satisfied before they proceed a transaction, without learning what polices are used. This is the first ATN protocol that ensures the perfect privacy preserving.
In order to fulfill the requirement of perfect privacy preserving protocol, we combine two cryptographical primitives for private set intersection protocol proposed by Freedman et. al in [7] and the secure multiparty protocol for set operations due to Kissner and Song in [8] .
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give fundamental definitions used in ATN and review the representative schemes of ATN. Section III provides some building blocks used to construct the proposed schemes. We use two cryptographical protocols for our purpose. In Section IV, after we describe the basic ideas for hiding access control policies and for implementing a conditional transfer, the proposed scheme is defined. Numerical example follows. In Section V, we conclude our study and discuss future studies.
II. TRUST NEGOTIATION

A. Fundamental Definition
A policy is a set of logical formula consisting of certificates. Figure I shows an example of policies owned by a client and a server, where R is a target service.
The logical relationship between client and server can be represented in a single trust target graph, shown in Fig. 2 
B. Two Extreme Strategies
In [2] Winsborough et. al proposed two extreme strategies for negotiation, an eager strategy in which both party disclose each policy immediately after the condition of policy client (n, ~ 4) server (n, ~ 8) is satisfied, and a parsimonious strategy in which policies are gradually disclosed only after sufficient policy is ensured. Definition 2.1: A policy disclosure rate is a ratio of disclosed policies over the whole policies, denoted by 71. A round of negotiation is a number of transmissions of message between two parties, denoted by p. For instance, the eager strategy gives the consensus in the sequence shown in Fig. 3 , yielding R, Cl, 81, C4, 84. The disclosure rate is 71,ag'" ~ 11/12 ~ 0.92 and the negotiation ends in Peager = 4 rounds. While, the parsimonious strategy discloses all possible (authorized to access) policies in Fig. 4 , which 77parsimonious = 6/12 = 0.5 in Pparsimonious = 7 steps. Both parties have three paths to the given target, (84, C4, 81, Cl, R), (C5' 82, C2, R) and (83, C2, C5, 82, R).
III. PRELIMINARY
A. Additive Homomorphic Public-key Encryption
To preserve the privacy of users, we use a public-key cryptosystem E which satisfies an additive homomorphic 
(1 )
For instance, the Paillier cryptosystem[lO] and the modified EIGamal cryptosystem are widely used. Both allow us to get key generation and decryption processes distributed among semi-trusted authorities sharing private key. The Paillier cryptosystem[1 0] consists of three algorithms, key generation, encryption, and decryption.
• Key generation: Let N be pq, a multiplication of large primes p and q, g E ZAJ2 be a generator whose order
public key is (N,g) and the private key is (.\,Il).
• Encryption: A ciphertext of M is defined with randomly chosen T E Z~2 as,
The Paillier is more efficient than the EIGamal in the sense of decryption overhead, while the latter requires a sort of brute force technique (in the limited domain) for decrypting candidates of messages. We implement the Paillier cryptosystem for performance evaluation since the single computational cost for encryption is more significant for our proposed protocol.
B. Private Matching[7]
Freedman et. al presents a cryptographical protocol for secure set intersection in [7] .
Let C and Sbesets of secret X ~ {X1,X2, ... ,XkJ for client C and Y ~ {Y1, Y2, . .. , YkJ for server S. User C uses a polynomial having elements of X as its root defined as For y, server S computers
E(P(y))" E(y) E(rP(y) + y)
and sends ks ciphertexts to C in random order, where T is uniform random number. Finally, client C decrypts the ciphertexts to obtain the elements of the intersection X n Y without learning any other element.
C. Secure Set Operations
In [8] , Kissner and Song extends Freedman's protocol so that multiple parties can perform union of each set in addition to intersection.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Threat Model
We assume passive adversaries. Namely, our threat model is semi-honest model, where parties follow the predetermined protocol honestly but may learn from information they received. In order to extend to malicious model, we need to add zero-knowledge proof to detect active behavior, such as intercepting and sending bogus messages.
131
B. Hidden Policy
Neither of the parsimonious or the eager strategies preserves the privacy of policies. We aim to minimize the policies disclosed to other even after their negotiation completed .
We wish to make party to send policy only if the corresponding logical condition is satisfied. To do so, we combine the secure protocol for set intersection [7] and the set operation protocol [8] . For example, the first policy in Fig. 1 For preserving privacy of policy, we have these polynomials encrypted with a public key of the other party.
For example, the ciphertext of polynomial P, (x) ~ x 2 -
which we denote by E(P,) for simplification. Note that the additive homomorphic property allows any party to evaluate the polynomial at an arbitrary point without revealing the plaintext.
C. Conditional Transfer
A party wishes to send all candidates of certificate only if the condition is met but without revealing which certificate is sent. The other party in turns send a new candidate policy whose condition has been satisfied with the previously sent policy. These interactions are processed with preserving privacy until a requested party verifies if the condition of the target is satisfied. What both party learn eventually from communication is just a boolean value.
To make it possible for the conditional transfer, we introduce a new trick based on the Fredman's protocol. Suppose that client having a policy Cl --+ 81 receives a encypted polinomial Es(P(x)) ~ Es((x -cr)(x -C2)) ~ (Eo,E"E2). He obliviously evaluates P(cr) as , EoE~' Eg-1 ~ E(P(C1)) and choosing a random number T sends back to server the condition of Cl as (2) where Q (y) ~ (y -81) is a polynomial hiding his condition 8, and Ec is an encryption with the client's public key. (Q(y) ), but we often write the two ciphertexts in the notation in Eq. (2) implicitly using hybrid encryption for simplification reason.
Es(P(cr)Y(Ec(Q(y)) ~ Es(rP(cr) + Ec(Q(y))
The client attempts to send each of his policies one by one in this manner since he does not know which policy is satisfied. In the example in Fig. 1 , the client sends four ciphertexts,
B, ES(T,P,(C,) + EC(Q3(Y)), B2 ES(T2P, (C2) + EC(Q4(y"Y2), B3 ES(T3P, (C4) + Ec(Qg(y),
B4 ES(T4P, (C5))'
where with only B1 and B2 the server succeeds to decrypt and extract the encoded polynomial Q3 and Q4' 2) The client evaluates the encrypted polynomial with encrypted for each certificate Ci of a policy Ci +- where T is uniformly chosen random number and P j is the corresponding polynomial defined from the j-th policy. If the polynomial has multiple, say m, variables, she needs attempting evaluation for all sizem, (~) combinations of her certificates. Finally, the server sends to the client AI, ... , Ans , ... , Anok.
5) Go to
Step 2 until either of them successfully decrypts null ciphertext, which is D(A) ~ 0, implying "Satisfied Negotiation". If the number of iteration is more than the number of policies (ns or ne), then terminates declaring "Negotiation Failure" Table II illustrates the sequence of messages sent from client and server having policies in Fig. 1 . In 5 rounds, the protocol is terminated successfully with decryption being zero and hence the server learn that their policies have an agreement to provide the requested service.
E. Example
F. Evaluation
We show a performance comparison of negotiation strategies in terms of degree of privacy to be preserved (disclosure rate), and the communication overhead in Table 1 . Our proposed protocol uses private set-intersection protocol for evaluating distributed policies and hence achieves perfect disclosure rate 77 = 0, while the conventional ATNs reveal partial knowledge, 71 ~ 0.5 for the parsimonious strategy and 71 ~ 0.91 for the eager strategy. The security of policies negotiation is based on that of public-key algorithm in semihonest model.
The round complexity of our proposed protocol is linear to the number of policies. For instance, the sample policies requires 5 rounds to terminate evaluation.
Our proposed scheme spends communication cost depending on the number of ciphertexts sent between parties. The number of ciphertexts increases as many conjunctive policies are specified, e.g., Step 3 in Table II with ten ciphertexts.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a new cryptographical protocol for trust negotiation with full privacy preserved. Our protocol allows parties with private policies to learn if their policies can be aggraded without revealing any piece of private information.
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B6 ~ E S(P , (C2) + E C(Q2(Y1,Y2))) B, ~ E S(P , (C4) + EC(Q4(Y))) Bs ~ ES(P1(CS))
Bg ~ E S (P 2 (C1) + EC(Q,(y))) BlO ~ E S(P2(C2) + E C(Q2(Y1, Y2))) B11 ~ E S(P2(C4) + EC(Q4(Y))) B'2 ~ ES(P2(CS))
Ds(B,) ~ EC(Q4(Y)), Ds(B11) ~ EC(Q4(Y))
and Ds(B12) = 0, hence ends "Successfully".
